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STUDENT NoTEs

but need not be by stealth, if the criminal intent is apparent. But
regardless of its nature, there must always be a taking. Alexander v.
Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 290, 20 S. W. 254; Ross v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky.
259, S3 S. W. 214. It may be by a non-human agency, i. e. not necessarily with the hands. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Allen (Mass.) 308,
81 Am. Dec. 706. The taking must also be without the owner's consent.
State v. England, 8 Jones (N. C.) 399, 80 Am. Dec. 334.
There must be some asportation or carrying away of the property
and it must be under the dominion and control of the trespasser, even
though it be but for an instant. Adams v. Commonwealth, 153 Ky. 88,
154 S. W. 381; Thompson v. State, 94 Ala. 535, 10 S. 520, 33 Am. St.
Rep. 145.
Since Larceny at common law was confined to goods and chattels,
it is now the rule that the thing taken must be personal property.
Blackburn v. Clark, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 659, 41 S. IV. 430. It must be something the law regards as property and of some value, but the least
value to the owner is sufficient. Wilson v. State, 1 Port. (Ala.) 118;
Commonwealth v. Cabot, 241 Mass. 131, 135 N. E. 465.
For there to be larceny the goods taken must be the property of
another than the taker. Love v. State, 78 Ga. 66, 3 S. E. 893. Special
property in another is sufficient and possession is enough as against
others than the owner. Ward v. People, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 395; Triplett v.
Commonwealth, 28 Ky. at 978, 91 S. W. 281; Commonwealth v. Rourke,
10 Cush. (Mass.) 397, 399.
Lastly, there must be a felonious intent or animus furandi which
exists both at the time of taking and of carrying away. State v.
Holmes, 17 Mo. 379, 57 Am. Dec. 269. Taking by mistake is not larceny. Criswell v. State, 24 Tex. App. 606, 7 S. W. 337. Neither is it
larceny to take under a bona fide claim of ownership no matter how
unfounded. Ross v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 20 S. W. 214; People v.
Schultz, 71 Mich. 315, 38 N. W. 868; Triplett v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky.
974, 91 S. W. 281. Ignorance here does not excuse as it might seem,
but it does negative a criminal intent.
JAsEs LYNE.
NEGLIGENCE-LIAILITY OF MANUFACTURER TO USER OF GooDs.-Plain-

tiff purchased a bottle of pop in X's place of business and drank part
of its contents. A quantity of arsenic troxide wrapped in tinfoil was
in the bottle; as a consequence plaintiff became ill and received permanent internal injuries. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the
ground that plaintiff failed to show that X procured the pop from the
defendant. However the following rule of law was laid down by the
court: "One who puts articles inherently or intrinsically dangerous
to life on the market owes the duty of care to all those persons who
ought to have been reasonably foreseen as likely to use them". Nehi
.Bottling Company v. Thomas, 236 Ky. 684, 33 S. NV.* (2nd) 701 (1930).
The liability of manufacturers or vendors to the ultimate user of
articles was first recognized in its present form of application in Judge
Sanborn's decision in Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120
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Fed. 865 (1903) where the negligence on the part of the manufacturer
was the placing of defective covering over the cylinder on a threshing
machine. Prior to that time manufacturers were only liable to third
persons when the instrumentality of injury was a dangerous article.
Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852), belladonna mislabeled as
extract of dandelion. Judge Sanborn's opinion, however, paved the way
for a long line of decisions which recognized liability in cases of "nondangerous" articles. After stating the general rule of non-liability of
manufacturers to third pdrsons he stated three exceptions to this rule.
The first exception only is applicable and need be stated here:
"An act of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor which is imminently
dangerous to the life or health of mankind and whch is committed in
the preparation or sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy or
affect human life, is actionable by third persons who suffer from the
negligence." This basis of liability has been quoted in Nehi Bottling
Co. v. Thomas, supra; Payton's Admr. v. Childers Electric Co. et aL,
228 Ky. 44, 14 S. W. (2nd) 208 (1929); and the case has been cited in
the decisions of numerous other courts.
One of the most outstanding opinions ever delivered on this subject
was that of Judge Cardozo in MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y.
382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
The defect was in a wheel on an automobile. Until that time certain categories had been enumerated in
which to place articles treated by the courts as dangerous, which
enumeration was most difficult and unsatisfactory to apply. These
classes were there disregarded and it was held that, "If the nature of
the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made it is then a thing of danger." This
meth6d of determining when liability exists had been used by the Kentucky courts in recent decisions. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton,
214 Ky. 118, 282 S. W. 778 (1926), where a bottle of pop was overcharged with carbon gas. The same test has been used by the courts
in other states. Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So.
64 (1931), where a bottle of pop was capped with a fly in it; Colbert v.
Holland Furnace Co., (Ill.) 164 N. E. 162 (1928), where the air grating
in the floor was defectively installed; White Sewing Machine Co. v.
Feisel, 162 N. E. 633 (1927), where a defective plug was used on the
end of a cord thru which electricity passed.
In many cases the courts have attempted to classify the articles
that are treated as dangerous. In Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 145 Ky.
616, 140 S. W. 1047 (1911), the court stated that a manufacturer is
liable to third persons, "(1) When he is negligent in the manufacture
and sale of an article intrinsically or inherently dangerous to health,
life or limb, or (2) when the maker sells an article for general use
which he knows to be imminently dangerous and unsafe and conceals to
the purchaser defects in its construction from which injury might
reasonably be expected to happen to those using it." In that case the
,defect was an automobile with a defectively attached rumble seat and
,was held to come within the second condition. This case probably has
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been cited more than any other Kentucky case on the subject, and has
been followed in Ky. Ind. Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, Adm'r., 208 Ky. 508, 271
S. W. 570 (1925). Because of the impractibility of applying this test
by placing the different articles in their proper class this distinguishIng process is highly undesirable. The courts usually prefer to take the
first exception stated by Judge Sanborn and treat that as the basis of
liability. Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 203 Ky. 408, 262 9. W. 583,
(1924).
Practically every Kentucky opinion rendered in this field of negligence contains the words, "imminently, inherently or intrinsically"
dangerous, and many of them make that the test of liability. This is
most unfortunate. The extreme difficulty in determining just what the
character of the article, the act of the defendant, and the relation of
the parties must be to permit a proper application of these adverbs as
a test will be seen in the cases. Articles treated as "imminently or
inherently" dangerous: a brake rod on a railroad coach, Ward v. Pullman Co., 138 Ky. 554, 128 S. W. 606 (1910); an automobile, Olds Motor
Works v. Shaffer, supra; gasoline poured into a retailer's kerosene
tank, Ky Ind. Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, Adm'r., supra; a steering wheel on
a farm tractor, Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 Fed. (2nd) 310 (1930);
hair dressing, Cahill v. Inecto, Inc., 203 N. Y. S. 1 (1924). Articles
treated as not "Imminently or inherently" dangerous: an elevator,
Slmons v. Gregory, 120 Ky. 116, 85 S. W. 751 (1905); combustible oil
in an oil engine, Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S. W. 245
(1907); a defectively installed cook stove, Besinger Outfitting Co. v.
Seamans, Adm'r.. 213 Ky. 157. 208 S. W. 941 (1926); a gas flatiron,
.Pitmanv. Lynn Gas d Electric Co., 241 Mass. 322, 35 N. E. 233 (1922);
defective circus seats, Lareabee v. Des Moines Tent and Awning Go.
et al., 189 Iowa 319, 178 N. W. 373 (1920).
The law on this subject seems to be rather definitely settled. As a
consequence of the past quarter century development, very little
remains of that former immunity of manufacturers from liability for
negligence in the fabrication of "non-dangerous" articles. "Things of
danger" in this field of the law are what a growing civilization
demands them to be. Therefore it seems that more just and consistent
decisions would result If the courts applied the test laid down by Judge
Cardozo rather than the one followed in the principle case (Nehi
Bottling Go. v. Thomas).
JAs. T. HATCHm.
SURETY-CONTRACTOR's BoND-LiABILITY TO MATEIAITE .- In the
May, 1931, issue of the Kentucky Law Journal there may be found a
case comment on the case of Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co.,
234 Ky. 764; 29 S. W. (2d) 29. This case was cited as controlling in
the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
239 Ky. 247; 39 S. W. (2d) 234.
By the terms of the bond in the latter (and principal) case the
surety was bound to a hotel company in the sum of $241,197, the condition being: "If the principal (contractor) shall faithfully perform

